For those with the time and the inclination the judgment is here
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2023/1671.html#I've higlighted some of the more pertinent parts below. This judgement does not set a precedent that 20 mph is the correct speed to approach a pedestrian crossing and/or bus stop when there are children in the vicinity.
Paragraph 14.
I add finally that I derive next to no assistance from previous decisions on the facts in previous trials of road traffic collisions. These are intensely fact-specific decisions. They do not help.
10. The court received an electronic trial bundle (in two parts) extending to 757 pages, plus video footage from the defendant's dashboard camera and from the CCTV system of the nearby Domino's Pizza restaurant. The court heard live evidence from two instructed accident reconstruction experts, Mr Hill and Ms Eyres, and then from Dr Chandran herself.
12. The Highway Code …
• Rule 125: the maximum speed stated by signage indicates the "absolute maximum speed" for the particular stretch of road. But adjustments must be made for prevailing conditions and hazards, including other road users and "particularly" children;
• Rule 146: drivers should particularly anticipate what children might do (by suddenly stepping out into the road et cetera) and drivers should be prepared to stop at pedestrian crossings or traffic lights as necessary;
• Rules 204 and 207: drivers should be particularly cautious about children, who are among the most vulnerable road users;
• Rule 205: cautions drivers to drive at a speed suitable to the conditions and with "the safety of children in mind";
• Rule 206: cautions drivers to drive carefully in residential areas or when driving past bus stops.
13. The general law of negligence …
• (1) The claimant must prove breach of duty on a balance of probabilities;
• (2) The standard is the "competent and experienced driver" (Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691); this is the reasonable prudent driver, not a counsel of perfection or an ideal, infallible driver; that is unrealistic, unfair and not in the public interest, setting the standard unattainably and exactingly high;
• (3) The duty is to take reasonable care;
• (4) A motor vehicle is a potentially lethal device or "weapon" (Lunt v Khelifa [2002] EWCA Civ 801, per Latham LJ at [20]);
• (5) Children can be unpredictable, imprudent and are highly vulnerable; therefore, caution must be exercised when they are in the vicinity of the road, and drivers should drive with children in mind and anticipate how they might behave (Moore v Pointer [1975] RTR 127, per Buckley LJ).
• (6) A reasonable prudent driver knows the provisions of the Highway Code...
32. The following facts can be derived from the testimony of the experts.
1. The traffic lights were green for approximately 8s before the accident;
2. The child was stationary at the crossing for approximately 2.3s;
3. The child started to move 0.7s before impact; [she broke into a run and stepped onto the carriageway when the car was 5 metres from her. See para 83]
4. The child's average speed once she started moving was approximately 4.8 m/s;
5. The child was on the carriageway for 0.4s before impact;
6. The child was moving on the carriageway for approximately 0.1s;
7. The child was stationary on the carriageway for approximately 0.3s (about ¾ of the time); [she froze]
8. While she was moving on the carriageway, she covered approximately 1 metre;
9. The defendant could have seen the claimant from 30 metres approximately.
33. As to 9., the court makes a finding of fact … that the defendant should have seen the claimant in the immediate vicinity of the pedestrian crossing when the defendant's vehicle was approximately 30 metres from the crossing.
45. I accept the evidence of the account Dr Chandran gave in (1) her immediate report to the police; (2) her witness statement; and (3) her evidence on oath that she was not aware of the child. She plainly was not – at least she was not conscious of seeing the child.
52. My conclusion is that Dr Chandran was principally guided by two factors (1) the maximum speed limit – she was just below it; (2) her own safety, a sentiment she repeated in various guises, "why would I put myself at risk from unsafe driving?" This is why she was able to say that she was driving, as she put it, at "the optimum speed". She said that if she had seen the child at the bus stop on her side of the road (northbound), she would have reduced her speed "dramatically". But there is no credible evidence that she adjusted her speed at all for the children at the bus stop on the southbound side, who could just as readily have stepped "unexpectedly" into the road (Rule 205). I do not accept the submission made on behalf of the defendant that it would be "ludicrous" to assume a child on the other side of the road may step out in front of a vehicle coming in the opposite direction. Regrettably, exactly this would happen within seconds on the defendant's carriageway.
53. I do not accept the defendant's submission that "mere presence of children" is not enough to require an adjustment of speed. Having children in the immediate vicinity of the road is certainly capable of requiring an adjustment of speed. It is not necessary, as the defendant submits, for the children to be "doing something" or that there must be "something more going on".
60. Towards the end of her cross-examination, she was asked by claimant counsel about the degree of speed reduction she would have made if she had seen the claimant standing by the controlled crossing waiting to cross. She said:
"It would probably be between 15 and 20 mph if I had seen a child." 64. Her approach to the requirements of the Highway Code was flawed. She said, "My understanding is you judge your speed to the visibility at the front of the road, and it's the same with darkness". This approach was confirmed by the fact that she said, "If I felt unsafe due to wet or darkness, I would have reduced [speed]", but she did not feel unsafe. Thus, rather than adjusting her speed due to rain or darkness, she relied upon whether she was feeling unsafe herself. The focus was on herself rather than the possible impact on other road users. This is confirmed by the answer, "If any factor had impacted on my safety, I would have reduced." This reveals a troubling absence of concern for other road users and the potential danger her vehicle moving at speed in suboptimal conditions presents. This flawed approach is confirmed by her belief that "the speed limit has been worked out to allow you to drive safely". Further, "I did not feel unsafe".
65. The net result of her belief is that if she was driving under the speed limit and she did not feel unsafe herself, that would be the appropriate speed. That this was her approach on the day of the collision is supported by the fact that despite the prevailing conditions and the road situation, she was driving at very nearly the maximum permitted speed. Therefore, I find that the defendant's approach to the Highway Code was flawed.
70. I must resolve the dispute between parties about what constitutes the reasonable speed for the road situation and driving conditions that prevailed on that stretch of Buckingham Road at the time of the accident. Rule 125 provides: "The speed limit is the absolute maximum and does not mean it is safe to drive at that speed irrespective of conditions. Driving at speeds too fast for the road and traffic conditions is dangerous. You should always reduce your speed when the road layout or condition presents hazards, such as bends sharing the road with pedestrians, cyclists and horse riders, particularly children, and motorcyclists."
71. The Rule makes it plain that the designated 30 mph is the absolute maximum. It must be adjusted due to prevailing conditions. The reasonable driver must "always reduce your speed" when sharing the road with pedestrians and "particularly" children. It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that:
"The only obligation for reasonable driver is to drive below the speed limit and to have a very heightened sense of alertness."
72. This cannot be correct. This submission would mean that irrespective of conditions, it would be permissible when the absolute speed limit is 30 mph to drive at 29 mph. The fallacy in this argument is that it omits the essential requirement for the reasonable driver to adjust his or her speed to reflect the prevailing hazards of the conditions. If the rain were so heavy or the fog so dense that visibility was severely restricted to a couple of metres beyond the windscreen, it would obviously be very dangerous to drive at 29 mph and thus "below the speed limit". To gauge what the reasonable speed for any relevant stretch of road in the prevailing conditions should be, all the obviously relevant factors should be taken into account, something that reasonable drivers habitually do. In this case, the collision occurred on a school day, at a time when children were on the way to school and likely to be using the bus stops (there were in fact children at the bus stop on the southbound side). It was an urban area with residential housing bordering the road in places, and certainly on the northbound side in the vicinity of the bus stop and pedestrian crossing. Front gardens of houses lead directly onto the pavement bordering the road right next to the northbound bus stop (Figs. 8 and 10., B140). It was both raining and dark. The BMW was approaching two bus stops and a pedestrian crossing.
78. Dr Chandran has driven the route "lots of times before" at a "similar time in the morning". She was "very familiar with the route" and was "just driving looking ahead". She was not consciously aware of the claimant waiting at the pedestrian crossing. That was because she was not paying sufficient attention. Without concluding she was in a state of approaching automatism, I find that her driving was likely to contain an element of autopilot. She had driven the precise route at the similar time so many (possibly hundreds) of times before in what her counsel called her "five-days-a-week-ritual". This resulted in her not adapting her driving to the obvious risks of the prevailing situation – all the listed hazard factors – because she did not feel "unsafe" and felt if she felt safe and was "within the speed limit", that was the "optimum speed". She did not make the reasonable and necessary adjustments for, as the Highway Code puts it, "road users requiring extra care" because children are among "the most vulnerable road users". That was an approach materially inconsistent with the Highway Code's safety principles. She drove in breach of and inconsistent with Rules 125, 146, 204, 205, 206 and 207. No breach of the Highway Code is determinative of negligence. But the court should have regard to them and weigh their cumulative effect.
79. Having done so, I find that the defendant's conduct demonstrated an approach that fell below the standard of a reasonable competent and experienced driver. I find that the breaches of the Code cumulatively amounted to a breach of duty of care in the circumstances that prevailed: a combination of her excessive and unsafe speed and lack of sufficient attention to conditions and other road users.
102. Let me draw this together. I reduce the court's analysis into the following ten critical findings.
1. I find that a reasonable and competent driver would have been driving the BMW more slowly at around 20 mph;
2. The corollary is that I find that the defendant was driving too fast given the situation and prevailing circumstances;
3. If the defendant had been paying proper and reasonable attention as she should have been, even if travelling at 28 mph, she should have seen the claimant from approximately 30 metres out. On this, I prefer the evidence of Mr Hill, although Ms Eyres accepted she was wrong about the vehicle in front obscuring the claimant at 40 metres (and thus also at 30 metres);
4. I find that the suggestion that she would have been distracted by the oncoming lights of the vehicle in opposite carriageway to have little merit.
5. I find that the taillights of V1 [the car in front] did not have any significant impact on Dr Chandran.
6. I find that if the defendant's vehicle were that extra significant distance away, as it should have been, when the claimant stepped into the road, that the claimant is unlikely to have frozen and stopped, but instead she is likely to have kept running.
7. I find that the extra time and distance created by Dr Chandran driving at the reasonable speed would have been sufficient, and not just marginally, for the claimant to have crossed most of the way across the road towards the southbound side.
8. I find that if the claimant had kept moving at her significant speed across the road, the defendant is likely to have braked. This is because the child would have been in front of the defendant and likely to be in the middle of the carriageway or slightly to the defendant's right. There would have been significantly less likelihood of the defendant swerving to the right in the direction in which the child was running.
9. Putting the above findings together, I find on a balance of probabilities that there would not have been a collision if the defendant had been driving at the safe and reasonable speed and there would have been no injury to the claimant.
10. I find, therefore, that the defendant's breach of duty caused the claimant's loss and damage.